Interventions by Indonesia at the Thematic Debates: Nuclear Issues

- In 2000, all state parties to the NPT agreed to a package of practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament. But what happened after five years? The nuclear-weapon-states backed-pedalling that agreement. Even worse, one of them said that nuclear disarmament is no longer exist and is part of history.

- Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing. Commitments and obligations to those two should be implemented in a balanced manner, without harming one into another.

- In this context, with regard to the implementation of obligations, undertakings and commitments of the 1995 and the 2000 Review Conferences, in the view of my delegation, the international community basically has done more to implement the provisions of nuclear non-proliferation rather than to nuclear disarmament.

- The followings are some positive developments with regard to the implementation of non-proliferation provisions:

  ■ The IAEA as the competent authority has conducted its responsibility to verify and assure, in accordance with its Statute, compliance with its safeguards agreements by States parties of the NPT undertaken in fulfillment of their obligations under Article III;

  ■ The effectiveness of IAEA safeguards have been assessed and evaluated leading to the implementation of the comprehensive safeguards agreements (CSA) and the Model Additional Protocol (MAP). There are only 37 states parties of the NPT that have not yet brought into force a CSA with the IAEA and 102 state parties have signed the MAP;

  ■ Regardless of its status, the DPRK was not brought into compliance with its treaty obligations. Libya announced that it gave up its nuclear weapons aspirations and has since come into compliance;

  ■ Over the past three years, the IAEA has been engaged with Iran to ensure its full compliance due to the discovery of its undeclared enrichment facility;

  ■ In order to enhance cooperation and to seek solution to all concern in the field of non-proliferation issues, a number of initiatives have been taken such as Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR), the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) and the Security Council Resolution 1540;
Meanwhile, some negative developments relate to nuclear disarmament are among others:

- There are about 30,000 nuclear weapons retained, many on alert status along with the attendant risk of accidental or unauthorized use which undeniably constitute a frightening possibility;

- The unilateral declaration of national security interests based on re-legitimization of nuclear weapons in the security strategies/doctrines of some nuclear-weapon-states will create another nuclear arms race and nuclear deterrence;

- There has been systematic attempts to de-link non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament which the 2000 Final Document held as “mutually reinforcing” with an exclusive focus on the former, thereby exacerbating discrimination and unsustainable double standards;

- The CTBT which was opened for signature and ratification in 1996 has not yet entered into force. The longer it is delayed, the more likely that testing will resume and become a major set back in the efforts to constrain the qualitative improvement of weapons and the development of new types of weapons.

- The resumption of negotiations on a fissile materials cut-off treaty is yet to get off the ground although it constitutes the next vital step in the multilateral disarmament agenda. Its conclusion has been frustrated by the imposition of untenable pre-conditions relating to verification.

- The Moscow Treaty of 2002 contains no commitment either to destroy or to render unusable weapons that are no longer operationally deployed. Unfortunately, reductions in deployment and in operational status can not substitute for irreversible cuts in and the total elimination of nuclear weapons;

- The abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) has led to negative implications for the development and deployment of anti-ballistic missile defense systems and the pursuit of advanced military technologies capable of deployment in outer space;

- The question of non-strategic nuclear weapons continues to be of concern due to their portability and ability to station them in close proximity to areas of conflict which make them susceptible to use in combat, the high probability of pre-delegation of authority to use in the event of conflict, and of an early, pre-emptive, unauthorized or accidental use;

- In conclusion, although not legally binding, the 13 practical steps should be reaffirmed and be used as the best tool for measuring progress efforts made by nuclear-weapon-States in the fulfillment of their Article VI obligations.