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NPT New in Review, Vol. 15, No. 3

Editorial: The best security assurance? Elimination
27 April 2018


Allison Pytlak

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Discussion at the Second Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) of the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has turned to the Treaty’s first pillar: disarmament. 

This word has become inclusive of many things over time: security assurances, treaties that deal with facets or specific types of nuclear weapons or material, or certain parts of the world; alert statuses; testing bans or moratoria. In developing this elaborate framework of checks, balances, agreements, and systems many have lost sight of what disarmament should include. Destruction, reduction, elimination are evaporating from an increasingly diluted landscape that functions as a distraction from non-action on the part of nuclear-armed states.

In its statement New Zealand reminded PrepCom delegates that the obligation to achieve “progressively full nuclear disarmament” was not included in the first drafts of the NPT but inserted at a later point in the negotiations at the insistence of a number of states, becoming a “pivotal draw card” that facilitated their voting in favour of the Treaty in the UN General Assembly, under the belief that this would happen.

It was a clever ruse, but the jig is up. Dozens of countries and numerous civil society organisations called out the nuclear development and modernisation programmes of the NPT nuclear-armed states parties for being incompatible with their NPT disarmament obligations. While this condemnation is not by any means new in the context of pillar one discussions, the pace and scale of such programmes has sparked greater criticism particularly given the context of heightened nuclear posturing, public highlighting of planned new nuclear capabilities, and little to no pretense of intending to disarm.

The United Kingdom was quite clear in stating that to abandon its nuclear deterrent unilaterally would undermine its security, and that of all states, and not make anyone safer. While the United States has utilised a variety of window-dressing exercises this week to assure its fellow states parties that the policies and intentions contained in its 2018 Nuclear Posture Review are in keeping with its NPT obligations, it defended the necessity of its weapons for global security. All nuclear-armed states parties are using the current “security environment” as an excuse for retaining their nuclear weapons, a point refuted by other states parties for its hollowness. “The global security situation can not justify the lack of progress in nuclear disarmament,” noted Mexico. “On the contrary, the context that we currently face reinforces the need for urgent actions to guarantee the elimination of this type of armament.”

 Sometimes, the nuclear-armed states called each other out; the actions of one seen as a threat or affront to another that is provoking responses in kind, creating a “combustible mix” in the words of one civil society representative.  As described by the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), “The existence of nuclear weapons and the "security" benefits attributed to them are root causes of the tensions themselves.” The increasingly vitriolic and accusatory rights of reply that have occurred at the end of each meeting this week are rare in the content of NPT conferences and expose the divisions and tensions between certain states, which are the true fault lines running beneath the NPT.

Frustration is rife in any discussion about security assurances, which formed an area of special focus in cluster one talks. It is evident that these assurances are not in themselves desirable but are the least that non-nuclear armed states should receive in return for their cooperation; an interim step in the so-called “step by step” process so valued by the nuclear-armed and their allies. “A call for negative security assurances should not be perceived as any sort of recognition for the continued possession of nuclear weapon,” noted South Africa, a point supplemented by Brazil when it stated that, “A treaty on negative security assurances is in principle a step in the right direction…but will not and cannot obfuscate the fact that the possession, use and threat of use of nuclear weapons shall continue to be considered a violation of international law, particularly of international humanitarian law, the international law of human rights, and now of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.”

Shortly before this edition was distributed, the leaders of two Koreas met for the third Inter-Korean Summit, which constitutes a massive diplomatic step forward. Cautious optimism is still needed however, as much remains to be seen. It can be anticipated that this might be referenced in cluster two discussions on non-proliferation, in the context of the North Korean nuclear weapons programme. The cessation of its programme is important and necessary for many reasons but should not take precedence over the disarmament obligations of nuclear-armed states or reinforce the two-tiered system and related notion of responsible nuclear-weapon possession.  In the words of Costa Rica, “The obligation to disarm is not optional or conditional.”

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